The Walsh Method of Evaluating Offensive Tackles

A quick look at Bill Walsh's coaching tree is evidence enough of the late coach's football genius. The modern NFL owes much of its coaching philosophy to Walsh, and though he clearly shaped today's coaching landscape by forging efficient leaders, he is remembered mostly for his true genius on the chalkboard. Few coaches can claim to have changed the game as much as Walsh, who – along with Sam Wyche, George Seifert, and others – helped to shape the West Coast concepts that still flavor nearly every team's offensive playbook today.

Walsh is a celebrated coach indeed, yet one of his most admired qualities was a truly impressive ability to stay ahead of the curve. His 1998 book, Finding the Winning Edge, is still heralded as football's holy scripture mostly due to Walsh's incredibly detailed view of how to run a successful organization (though it is sadly now out of print). Many of his predictions about the modern NFL are spot on; for example, he wrote that many teams in the 90's shied away from a 3-4 defense, but argued that popularity of defensive systems is cyclical, so he expected teams to eventually return to the 3-4. (Which they most certainly did.)

He also led the way with extremely accurate and effective personnel evaluation. In Finding the Winning Edge, Walsh defined the exact characteristics a player needed to exhibit to enjoy success in his 49ers organization. Once I got my hands on a copy of the prolific tome, I was especially interested in his section on offensive linemen. Specifically, I was curious to see how this "Walsh Method" holds up in today's league, with today's linemen.


Walsh outlined the various strengths that he looked for in offensive tackles; are those same qualities as important in today's league?


For each position, I'll offer a summary of his argument, followed by my analysis of how it holds up in 2012. First in the series of posts is offensive tackle. Let's take a look:

Offensive Tackle

Walsh's take:

He acknowledges the increasing weight of tackles, but says that getting up to 330 pounds or more is unnecessary. Players who weigh that much "...play well in spite of weighing 330, not because of it. The only apparent benefit of weighing that much is to attract the attention of the television camera crew" (p. 125). There are certainly players in this weight range who are successful, but Walsh believes they might enhance their performance by dropping weight. His "ideal size" for a tackle is listed at 6'4", 310 pounds.

Bubba Paris is one of the examples Bill Walsh gives
 of an ideal offensive tackle.

According to Walsh, the one absolutely essential physical trait for this position is girth. (ed. note: "girth" is not defined explicitly by Walsh. My best definition is "having a naturally large bone structure, especially in the hips, thighs and shoulders.") Strength, agility and body control rank right underneath girth as priorities, not necessarily in that order.

Long arms are also important to gain leverage. A tackle's ability to move within a 2-yard by 2-yard box is critical since the large majority of their most important duties take place in that box. This can be coached to an extent, but players without natural ability in this box won't be able to accomplish as much.

Another aspect of the tackle's play that can be coached is the timing and execution of blocks, although once again, much of this comes naturally to a good player.

Next is adaptability. Walsh saw the 1990s as a new era in offensive line play, in that the increased complexity of NFL defenses meant the tackle now had to deal with three or four possible scenarios, whereas there used to be only one or two possibilities to anticipate. An example of this would be a LB blitzing from the outside while the DE who was expected to rush drops into coverage instead. The modern offensive tackle, Walsh argues, must be able to recognize these variations immediately and react accordingly.

The last key point Walsh makes about tackles is a psychological one. More than most of the other positions on the field, they must have an extremely high level of confidence and self-control in order to be able to stay composed when things go wrong on the field.

Analysis:

I could not agree with Walsh more on his last two points. A successful NFL offensive tackle must be incredibly smart and quick-thinking, yet highly stable psychologically. He can never be too "up" or "down." Whereas certain positions (mostly defensive) can just "get angry" and up their level of play, the offensive tackle will quickly make mistakes if he gets too amped – or conversely, dejected – and leaves his ideal mental zone.

Joe Thomas is a prime example of intelligence, adaptability,
 and agility at the tackle position in today's NFL.

Adaptability is even more important now than in 1998. Wide receivers are arguably more physically dominant today than they were when Walsh coached, so defenses rely on increased pressure to even the playing field. To do this, they throw increasingly complicated stems, stunts, and blitzes at the offensive line in an effort to confuse them and thus diminish the potential role of Calvin Johnson-esque receivers. Consequently, offensive linemen who are able to recognize and adapt to the plethora of defensive looks they see are more valuable than ever.

Their ability to recognize a blitz is important, but if they cannot physically match up with the agility of elite pass rushers, today's tackles are essentially useless. Pass protection schemes now often rely on sending a running back or tight end to "chip" a pass rusher (read: give him a shot right in the windpipe) before they head off into a route, thereby making the tackle's job easier. If an offense doesn't need to involve skill players in pass protection as much because their tackles are agile in that 2x2 yard box, then they have more freedom in their passing schemes.

Walsh's point on weight might be his most contentious, though. If he was correct that tackles didn't need to weigh 330 pounds back then, Since Finding the Winning Edge was published in 1998, the average weight of NFL offensive tackles ballooned up from 311 pounds to 320 in 2000. Since then, it has hovered around the 'teens and 20's. 

He lists the 1997 NFC Pro Bowlers as such:

Lomas Brown – Arizona Cardinals (6'4" 275 lbs.)

Willie Roaf – New Orleans Saints (6'5" 300 lbs.)

Erik Williams – Dallas Cowboys (6'6" 324 lbs.)

Now, here are the 2012 NFC Pro Bowlers:

Jason Peters – Philadelphia Eagles (6'4" 340 lbs.)

Joe Staley – San Francisco 49ers (6'5" 315 lbs.)

Jermon Bushrod – New Orleans Saints (6'5" 315 lbs.)

Granted, the sample size here is fairly small (the number of men, not the men themselves), so the heights and weights listed are not statistically significant. Nevertheless, we can see from the short list of gifted tackles who played 15 years apart – a long time in the NFL – that Walsh is correct in identifying natural girth as the most basic requirement of a great tackle. In today's game, a tackle under 6'4" has little chance of succeeding.  

But can weighing over 330 pounds be detrimental to a tackle's ultimate potential?

Jermon Bushrod - 6'5" 315 lbs.

Jason Peters - 6'4" 340 lbs.

Above are two of last year's Pro Bowlers. On the left is Jermon Bushrod, while Jason Peters is on the right. Keep in mind that both of these men are elite offensive tackles. Bushrod is slightly larger (1 inch taller, 10 pounds heavier) than Walsh's "ideal" tackle, while Peters is significantly heavier.

Both men are Pro Bowlers because they possess a natural girth in bone structure, and they developed power and agility over the course of their careers. Bushrod especially has long arms, which is advantageous because it allows him to create separation from defenders in pass protection.

The logical sequence for this analysis is to declare one of these players "better" than the other. However, I can't necessarily agree with Walsh's point. Having played every offensive line position at various weights, the best way I can sum up my modification of Walsh's argument is this:

In most cases, playing over 330 does not hurt a tackle's ultimate potential. It just makes him a different type of player.

For me (granted, a shorter player than either of the above gentlemen) it was difficult to really push linemen around at 250 or 260. Once I got up in the 285 range, run blocking became significantly easier. Conversely, my agility on downfield blocks was affected (you guessed it) negatively. Staying on linebackers once I reached them became more difficult. Blocking safeties and corners became a comically futile lumbering struggle.

Hence, playing at different weight levels creates a slightly different skill set based on the player. I'd be more likely to feature Bushrod in an offense with lots of zone rushing and bootlegs, so he could set the point on defensive ends and make blocks downfield. A player with Bushrod's build would generally also be the more agile pass protector, and would be more capable of taking on elite pass rushers without help from a tight end or running back. Conversely, Peters is more naturally suited for a power running game, yet that does not preclude him from being a great zone blocker or pass protector.


This brings me to what I see as Walsh's most important point, and that is the extent to which these various types of blocks come naturally to linemen. To give a personal example, I developed a natural feel for pass protection over time thanks to lots of coaching and countless reps in practice and games; it just made sense to me physically in a way that other types of blocking didn't. I never really figured out the footwork necessary to stay on downfield run blocks, despite intense study and repetition.


Therefore, I don't believe in Walsh's blanket statement that tackles weighing 330-plus should drop weight. For those who are naturally skilled in certain types of blocking, playing at a higher weight emphasizes their strengths and allows the offensive coordinator to lean upon those strengths in his gameplan. In today's league, 330 isn't nearly as massive as it was to Walsh in 1998. Yet other skills and values – mindset, adaptability, agility – are more important now than ever. It seems that once again, Walsh was ahead of the curve.

Super Bowl XLVI: O-Line/D-Line Preview

The Super Bowl always receives significantly more media attention than necessary for any football game, so I don't even plan to talk about the rehashed plot lines. The Tom Brady et al are out for revenge story is incredibly lame, since (as Deadspin already pointed out) "There are precisely seven players on New England's roster who were there in 2008, and 16 on New York's." Most people just play along with the media crazies, enjoying the ride and preparing for Sunday.


On this blog, however, most of the anticipation comes from seeing a battle between two teams' offensive and defensive lines. These groups are incredibly skilled, but in different styles of play. Let's take a look at what makes these four units special, and what keys they'll be focusing on Sunday:

Above: Chris Snee and company will need to minimize Vince Wilfork's impact to maintain drives.

First up, the New York Giants' front five. These guys are (and have been, for years) all about the power running game. New York has a very blue-collar attitude on the o-line, which is fitting considering the fact that their jerseys indeed have blue collars.


They're quick enough to execute pulling blocks, but big and strong enough (average weight: 308) to make their down blocks effective. This combination of strength and speed in a power scheme gives the G-men's bruising running back tandem enough room to rip off huge gains.


This unit has played exceptionally well, considering they cut tackle Shawn Andrews, guard Rich Seubert, and center Shaun O'Hara in the offseason. Will Beatty stepped up at left tackle this season after starting only two games in 2010, and New York landed a major free agent in former 49ers center David Baas.


The Giants will be looking to their o-line to chew up clock and keep the explosive Patriots' offense off the field. They also should expect blitzes from New England to overcompensate for a dreadful secondary. Give #10 enough time and he should be able to pick them apart.


The two star o-linemen for New York are guards Chris Snee and David Diehl (right and left, respectively), who will attempt to stop the Patriots' best defensive weapon:

Above: If the Pats make a play on defense Sunday, chances are Wilfork will have had a hand in it.

Vince Wilfork is the Patriots' d-line. He had a monster season in 2011, with 52 total tackles, 3.5 sacks and two (two!) interceptions. However, most of his dominance lies outside the stat line. 


Even on plays where he doesn't make the tackle, Wilfork can absolutely demolish an o-line's blocking scheme by driving the center and/or guard into the backfield immediately. He doesn't have an amazing overall pass rush, but when he uses his bull rush move he can be devastating to opposing offenses.


Baas will have his hands full the entire game trying to deal with Wilfork, and it's a matchup I've been anticipating. It's always interesting to see how centers try to minimize Wilfork's impact, but based on the big-time game Wilfork had in the AFC Championship, Snee and Diehl will also need to share the workload.

Above: They might look a bit grungy, but the Patriots o-line is exceptional at pass blocking.

Next up, the Patriots o-line. This is one of the best pass blocking units I've ever seen, led by a virtually impenetrable left side consisting of Pro Bowl guard Logan Mankins and tackle Matt Light. Mankins can legitimately do it all, as he showed in the AFC Championship Game when he pulled around to the right side and cleared out two linebackers for a Patriots touchdown. Right guard Brian Waters was also voted into the Pro Bowl this season.


This o-line runs the zone fairly well, but their primary job is to give #12 time in the pocket. This became painfully evident to the Denver Broncos in the divisional round, when their Pro Bowl pass rush tandem of Von Miller and Elvis Dumervil didn't manage a single sack. Of course, Denver's hapless Brian Dawkins-less safeties allowed New England to use their quick game passing the entire night. But even when Denver brought the house on blitzes, the Patriots o-line managed to create enough time for completions.


The matchup I have been looking forward to the most for Super Bowl XLVI is the New England o-line's pass protection against the New York Giants' d-line. 

Above: Look for Jason Pierre-Paul to take advantage of Nate Solder's inexperience.

New York's only Pro Bowler other than Eli Manning is second-year phenom defensive end Jason Pierre-Paul. JP-P is mirrored by a productive Justin Tuck, and the two have combined for 21.5 sacks this season. Add in Linval Joseph and Chris Canty on the interior, and you've got an o-lineman's nightmare.


I expect Light to be able to manage either one of these ends, but Pats rookie right tackle Nate Solder (a first round pick, but still inexperienced) has been somewhat inconsistent this season. He notably struggled against Cameron Wake when New England played Miami early this season, and Wake's pass rushing style is similar to that of Pierre-Paul.


If Solder can't protect in the game's crucial moments, the Giants' d-line will be able to put a damper on New England's hypersonic offense (much like what they did to Green Bay in the NFC Championship). The same will occur for the Giants' offense if Snee, Baas, and Diehl cannot contain Wilfork. Either way, the o-line/d-line matchup this week is definitely one of super proportions.

Chalk Talk: Playing Offensive Line in the Triple Option

In my 13 years playing offensive line, I took part in several offensive systems throughout high school and college: pro-style, spread, pistol, and even a variation of West Virginia's offense called the "shot-run." Yet one of the most fun systems to play o-line in was undoubtedly the triple option.

I reported for my first training camp at Colorado College in August 2008. The Tigers' offensive coordinator left during the offseason to take the head coaching job at Grinnell, which is actually where I ended up once Colorado College cut football. Anyway, while meeting my fellow freshmen football players for the first time, I heard rumblings that we were going to run "the triple option."

I was coming from a high school where we were in the shotgun 95% of the time, and using 5-wide sets for at least a third of our plays. This was during a magical time when coaches across the country thought the spread offense couldn't be stopped. Unicorns danced in fields made of rainbows and puppy smiles. I liked playing o-line in the spread, and the pressure of passing on most plays developed in me an unflappable confidence in pass protection. I hadn't even heard of the triple option.

Our rival high school ran a bastardized double-tight version of the flexbone which we affectionately referred to as "the turtle," but I didn't know that it was actually an abomination derived from Paul Johnson's triple option. In the coming weeks and months, I would come to simultaneously revile and enjoy playing in the sweet simplicity of the triple option.

What's so great about playing in an offense that passes the football maybe three times a game, you ask? You can absolutely terrorize the defensive linemen.

Ask any d-lineman who has played against the triple option, and he will tell you he absolutely hates it; he will also probably call it stupid, because he doesn't want to say he is afraid of it. Offensive linemen have three jobs on the base triple option play: cut a d-lineman, double-team a d-lineman, or cut a linebacker. (a cut block is aimed at the defender's knees with the intention of getting them to fall down.)

At Colorado College, we literally used our entire practice time practicing these three blocks. It gets ingrained in the very fiber of your being, to the point where all you have to think about before a snap is how you are going to ruin your defender's world.

Did I mention we played out of a four-point stance? On passing plays, we actually had to take a step forward before we could start our pass blocking. When a defensive lineman is uncertain of whether he is going to be double-teamed or cut, he can't play to the best of his ability. I prided myself in causing these d-linemen to live in fear. I was a football terrorist, and I loved it.

Let's take a look at what makes the base play of the triple option so simple for offensive linemen.

The video footage used in making these images is courtesy of ESPN.

This is Air Force, who is located in the same city as Colorado College. Their offense rushed for over 314 yards per game (third in the nation). The quarterback reads the second man on or outside the center, which in this case is the defensive end. Therefore, the right tackle won't even worry about him; instead, he will slam down on the 3-technique with the guard, with the intent of working up to the playside linebacker.

The center and left guard will execute scoop blocks. They will take at least three steps at a 45-degree angle to the right; if the noseguard stays where he is the guard will cut him while the center goes downfield to cut the flowing linebacker.

The left tackle's job is essentially to keep the 5-technique lined up on his outside shoulder from making a play. Any line-of-scrimmage players outside the 5-tech are too far away to make a play if the quarterback hands off to the fullback.

After the first step, everything is going fairly well. The left guard is in the process of cutting the nose while the center works up to the backside linebacker, and the frontside double-team is nearly underway. The quarterback already has his eyes on the defensive end in order to see whether he should give the ball up the middle or keep it.

All blocks are developing flawlessly. You can see that the left tackle's assignment is too busy trying not to get cut to pursue after the play. Meanwhile, the #1 option player has come down to tackle the fullback, so the quarterback is pulling the ball to keep his second and third options alive (keep it or pitch it).

The play has devolved into absolute carnage at the line of scrimmage, which is exactly what the offensive linemen want. It is a hallmark of this offense to be able to get your skill players in space with defenders who could potentially make mistakes. To be clear, the offensive linemen have no idea whether the ball will be given, kept, or pitched on this play. They simply execute their assignment and let the brains of the offense (the quarterback) call all the shots. It's a very blue-collar type of football to play o-line in; just punch the timeclock and beat the crap out of defenders.

The triple option is all about getting the defenders to second-guess themselves, and this play does so perfectly. The circled defender is supposed to follow the pitch man, but with the quarterback running straight at him, he hesitates. The resulting pitch goes for a touchdown.

Of course, this isn't the only play in the triple option; however, defenses think they can stop it by assigning defenders specific roles against this play. As Chris Brown has pointed out, this doesn't work. A triple-option guru can just change the blocking assignments. As an offensive lineman, you just do what they tell you. It's nice being able to turn your brain off (or at least down a little) while playing football.

In the interest of full disclosure, our offense was absolutely terrible that season. Attempting to run the triple option with spread personnel is insanely difficult; it requires lots of time drilling the concepts into players. Especially crucial is having a quarterback who is comfortable making the split-second decisions crucial to the offense's success. However, as an o-lineman, it was rather pleasant just focusing on hitting people as hard as possible. Offenses where I was actually required to think before plays were more rewarding, but this one was pretty damn fun.

How the Denver Broncos can succeed long-term with Tim Tebow

How will Tebow keep winning long-term?
Hint: JD Walton plays an important role.

Over 2000 years after His arrival on earth, there is still a debate about whether Jesus Christ is the Jewish Messiah foretold in the Old Testament.

It seems the disputation of whether Tim Tebow is the savior of Denver's Super Bowl hopes might last nearly as long.

The arguments have been hashed and rehashed to the point of white noise; it's the classic he's a winner, bro vs. he doesn't make mid-range throws any respectable QB should be able to complete. Nearly every time the man exits the postgame podium, talk-radio fires are stoked once more.

So, to avoid redundancy about whether the Broncos should keep Tim Tebow long-term, let's just talk about what they need to do if they decide to ride the Tebow Train to Super Bowl glory or utter oblivion.

If John Elway & Co. ™ do indeed buy into Tebow for the foreseeable future, they must buy in all the way. No more straddling the fence with cryptic interview answers about Tebow's future. If he's the guy, start acting like it. This starts and ends with personnel. Elway and GM Brian Xanders must look for offensive personnel that fit neatly into Mike McCoy's Tebow-ized zone-read and zone-option scheme. Finding great fits requires thinking outside the box. For example, a happy accident for this offense is Demaryius Thomas.

Thomas was Josh McDaniels' first pick in the 2010 NFL Draft. At the time, he was just the safer option over Dez Bryant, who had character questions coming into the draft. A few questions were raised about drafting a receiver who played in the triple option at Georgia Tech. However, Thomas ended up being a perfect match for McCoy's new offense because of his time at Georgia Tech.

Demaryius Thomas was a triple option wide receiver, which makes him perfect for Denver.

Receivers in Paul Johnson's triple option spend the entire game stalk blocking corners and safeties, and then they go deep for a couple touchdowns per game. Coaches recruit receivers to triple option schools by saying, "you might only catch 2 balls a game, but it will be for 150 yards and 2 touchdowns because you'll be that open." Thomas' stat line from last week's Wild Card win over Pittsburgh? 4 catches for 204 yards and a touchdown. He gets his chance on deep play-action passes, and he does not disappoint.

The most important offensive personnel to find, though? More guys like Zane Beadles and JD Walton. McDaniels' second and third round picks from the 2010 Draft (McDaniels is looking pretty smart now, right?), they were solid offensive linemen who didn't require first-round money to obtain. If Denver scouts can identify more linemen that would be comfortable in this offensive system, those same linemen will likely be undervalued by other teams because they don't fit as well in a pro-style scheme.

Tim Tebow would be the first to admit his success is impossible without the young Denver o-line.

Tebow is admittedly a master at running the zone-read option. He faked the handoff to Willis McGahee so well last Sunday that it took Steelers LB James Harrison ridiculously long to realize Tebow still had the ball. (If WR Matt Willis had stayed on his block, that play would have been a touchdown.) However, the scheme would blow up in Tebow's face every play were it not for the superb blocking of Denver's offensive line. The organization has a long-held tradition of great offensive line play by undervalued players, and McCoy's offense offers an amazing possibility to keep this tradition going. The Broncos do need to develop run blocking from their tight ends, who currently struggle with staying on their blocks.

The last step? Continue developing the defensive backfield. Denver has a pass-rushing duo in Elvis Dumervil and Von Miller that will terrorize opposing offensive lines for years to come, but when the rush doesn't come immediately the Broncos' safeties are picked apart. This is in part because rookies Quinton Carter and Rahim Moore are experiencing an oft-unpleasant trial by fire. Both show flashes of brilliance followed by frustrating mental mistakes. Denver must develop these young players, and draft young talent to develop underneath Champ Bailey and Andre Goodman (both age 33), who have been stellar but will eventually retire.

In short, success is absolutely possible with Tebow. Denver has defied all odds and can continue to do so, but they must commit fully one way or the other. Embrace McCoy's collegiate scheme and develop the personnel to run it, or scrap everything and go back to a pro-style offense. Either choice is understandable, but the Broncos will drown if they refuse to commit one way or the other. It is an incredible risk to bank on Tebow's success, as it puts the careers of nearly everyone associated with the program in jeopardy if he fails. Having said that, if I had to bet my career on one player, it would undoubtedly be Tebow.