The Walsh Method of Evaluating Offensive Tackles

A quick look at Bill Walsh's coaching tree is evidence enough of the late coach's football genius. The modern NFL owes much of its coaching philosophy to Walsh, and though he clearly shaped today's coaching landscape by forging efficient leaders, he is remembered mostly for his true genius on the chalkboard. Few coaches can claim to have changed the game as much as Walsh, who – along with Sam Wyche, George Seifert, and others – helped to shape the West Coast concepts that still flavor nearly every team's offensive playbook today.

Walsh is a celebrated coach indeed, yet one of his most admired qualities was a truly impressive ability to stay ahead of the curve. His 1998 book, Finding the Winning Edge, is still heralded as football's holy scripture mostly due to Walsh's incredibly detailed view of how to run a successful organization (though it is sadly now out of print). Many of his predictions about the modern NFL are spot on; for example, he wrote that many teams in the 90's shied away from a 3-4 defense, but argued that popularity of defensive systems is cyclical, so he expected teams to eventually return to the 3-4. (Which they most certainly did.)

He also led the way with extremely accurate and effective personnel evaluation. In Finding the Winning Edge, Walsh defined the exact characteristics a player needed to exhibit to enjoy success in his 49ers organization. Once I got my hands on a copy of the prolific tome, I was especially interested in his section on offensive linemen. Specifically, I was curious to see how this "Walsh Method" holds up in today's league, with today's linemen.


Walsh outlined the various strengths that he looked for in offensive tackles; are those same qualities as important in today's league?


For each position, I'll offer a summary of his argument, followed by my analysis of how it holds up in 2012. First in the series of posts is offensive tackle. Let's take a look:

Offensive Tackle

Walsh's take:

He acknowledges the increasing weight of tackles, but says that getting up to 330 pounds or more is unnecessary. Players who weigh that much "...play well in spite of weighing 330, not because of it. The only apparent benefit of weighing that much is to attract the attention of the television camera crew" (p. 125). There are certainly players in this weight range who are successful, but Walsh believes they might enhance their performance by dropping weight. His "ideal size" for a tackle is listed at 6'4", 310 pounds.

Bubba Paris is one of the examples Bill Walsh gives
 of an ideal offensive tackle.

According to Walsh, the one absolutely essential physical trait for this position is girth. (ed. note: "girth" is not defined explicitly by Walsh. My best definition is "having a naturally large bone structure, especially in the hips, thighs and shoulders.") Strength, agility and body control rank right underneath girth as priorities, not necessarily in that order.

Long arms are also important to gain leverage. A tackle's ability to move within a 2-yard by 2-yard box is critical since the large majority of their most important duties take place in that box. This can be coached to an extent, but players without natural ability in this box won't be able to accomplish as much.

Another aspect of the tackle's play that can be coached is the timing and execution of blocks, although once again, much of this comes naturally to a good player.

Next is adaptability. Walsh saw the 1990s as a new era in offensive line play, in that the increased complexity of NFL defenses meant the tackle now had to deal with three or four possible scenarios, whereas there used to be only one or two possibilities to anticipate. An example of this would be a LB blitzing from the outside while the DE who was expected to rush drops into coverage instead. The modern offensive tackle, Walsh argues, must be able to recognize these variations immediately and react accordingly.

The last key point Walsh makes about tackles is a psychological one. More than most of the other positions on the field, they must have an extremely high level of confidence and self-control in order to be able to stay composed when things go wrong on the field.

Analysis:

I could not agree with Walsh more on his last two points. A successful NFL offensive tackle must be incredibly smart and quick-thinking, yet highly stable psychologically. He can never be too "up" or "down." Whereas certain positions (mostly defensive) can just "get angry" and up their level of play, the offensive tackle will quickly make mistakes if he gets too amped – or conversely, dejected – and leaves his ideal mental zone.

Joe Thomas is a prime example of intelligence, adaptability,
 and agility at the tackle position in today's NFL.

Adaptability is even more important now than in 1998. Wide receivers are arguably more physically dominant today than they were when Walsh coached, so defenses rely on increased pressure to even the playing field. To do this, they throw increasingly complicated stems, stunts, and blitzes at the offensive line in an effort to confuse them and thus diminish the potential role of Calvin Johnson-esque receivers. Consequently, offensive linemen who are able to recognize and adapt to the plethora of defensive looks they see are more valuable than ever.

Their ability to recognize a blitz is important, but if they cannot physically match up with the agility of elite pass rushers, today's tackles are essentially useless. Pass protection schemes now often rely on sending a running back or tight end to "chip" a pass rusher (read: give him a shot right in the windpipe) before they head off into a route, thereby making the tackle's job easier. If an offense doesn't need to involve skill players in pass protection as much because their tackles are agile in that 2x2 yard box, then they have more freedom in their passing schemes.

Walsh's point on weight might be his most contentious, though. If he was correct that tackles didn't need to weigh 330 pounds back then, Since Finding the Winning Edge was published in 1998, the average weight of NFL offensive tackles ballooned up from 311 pounds to 320 in 2000. Since then, it has hovered around the 'teens and 20's. 

He lists the 1997 NFC Pro Bowlers as such:

Lomas Brown – Arizona Cardinals (6'4" 275 lbs.)

Willie Roaf – New Orleans Saints (6'5" 300 lbs.)

Erik Williams – Dallas Cowboys (6'6" 324 lbs.)

Now, here are the 2012 NFC Pro Bowlers:

Jason Peters – Philadelphia Eagles (6'4" 340 lbs.)

Joe Staley – San Francisco 49ers (6'5" 315 lbs.)

Jermon Bushrod – New Orleans Saints (6'5" 315 lbs.)

Granted, the sample size here is fairly small (the number of men, not the men themselves), so the heights and weights listed are not statistically significant. Nevertheless, we can see from the short list of gifted tackles who played 15 years apart – a long time in the NFL – that Walsh is correct in identifying natural girth as the most basic requirement of a great tackle. In today's game, a tackle under 6'4" has little chance of succeeding.  

But can weighing over 330 pounds be detrimental to a tackle's ultimate potential?

Jermon Bushrod - 6'5" 315 lbs.

Jason Peters - 6'4" 340 lbs.

Above are two of last year's Pro Bowlers. On the left is Jermon Bushrod, while Jason Peters is on the right. Keep in mind that both of these men are elite offensive tackles. Bushrod is slightly larger (1 inch taller, 10 pounds heavier) than Walsh's "ideal" tackle, while Peters is significantly heavier.

Both men are Pro Bowlers because they possess a natural girth in bone structure, and they developed power and agility over the course of their careers. Bushrod especially has long arms, which is advantageous because it allows him to create separation from defenders in pass protection.

The logical sequence for this analysis is to declare one of these players "better" than the other. However, I can't necessarily agree with Walsh's point. Having played every offensive line position at various weights, the best way I can sum up my modification of Walsh's argument is this:

In most cases, playing over 330 does not hurt a tackle's ultimate potential. It just makes him a different type of player.

For me (granted, a shorter player than either of the above gentlemen) it was difficult to really push linemen around at 250 or 260. Once I got up in the 285 range, run blocking became significantly easier. Conversely, my agility on downfield blocks was affected (you guessed it) negatively. Staying on linebackers once I reached them became more difficult. Blocking safeties and corners became a comically futile lumbering struggle.

Hence, playing at different weight levels creates a slightly different skill set based on the player. I'd be more likely to feature Bushrod in an offense with lots of zone rushing and bootlegs, so he could set the point on defensive ends and make blocks downfield. A player with Bushrod's build would generally also be the more agile pass protector, and would be more capable of taking on elite pass rushers without help from a tight end or running back. Conversely, Peters is more naturally suited for a power running game, yet that does not preclude him from being a great zone blocker or pass protector.


This brings me to what I see as Walsh's most important point, and that is the extent to which these various types of blocks come naturally to linemen. To give a personal example, I developed a natural feel for pass protection over time thanks to lots of coaching and countless reps in practice and games; it just made sense to me physically in a way that other types of blocking didn't. I never really figured out the footwork necessary to stay on downfield run blocks, despite intense study and repetition.


Therefore, I don't believe in Walsh's blanket statement that tackles weighing 330-plus should drop weight. For those who are naturally skilled in certain types of blocking, playing at a higher weight emphasizes their strengths and allows the offensive coordinator to lean upon those strengths in his gameplan. In today's league, 330 isn't nearly as massive as it was to Walsh in 1998. Yet other skills and values – mindset, adaptability, agility – are more important now than ever. It seems that once again, Walsh was ahead of the curve.

O-Line Game Notes: New Orleans at San Francisco

Photo courtesy of the Associated Press.

Venturing cautiously from their precious dome for the first time in a month, the New Orleans Saints traveled to San Francisco this week for the NFC's most anticipated postseason matchup thus far.

From an offensive line standpoint, both teams protect well on blitzing downs. San Francisco has the league's third highest passer rating against the blitz, whereas New Orleans is number five. Let's take a look at how the two units executed their respective gameplans today:


First Quarter 

• With nearly 4:30 remaining in the quarter, Roman Harper blitzed off the right side. There weren't enough blockers to pick Harper up, making him the "hot" blitzer. Alex Smith wasn't able to throw hot off of Harper, resulting in a fumble and a fight between San Francisco's offensive line and New Orleans' defensive line. This kind of chippiness early on can become extreme as the game wears on.

• Vernon Davis scored on a 49-yard reception with 2:08 left in the first quarter. The Saints brought some forceful inside stunts designed to get the San Francisco's interior o-line on different levels so that rushing lanes would be available. The 49ers did a great job picking up the stunts, and Smith had ample time to throw.

• New Orleans managed to pick up the 49ers second corner blitz in a row, but even after stepping up in the pocket, Brees threw a route that got jumped by Goldson. The 49ers' second takeaway is thanks to masked coverage rather than a good blitz.

• The broadcasters praised Frank Gore's pass protection on Smith's second touchdown pass with 0:41 remaining, and for good reason. Running backs are rarely asked to protect the opposite side of where they start the play, but Gore did so admirably against Will Smith.

Above: Alex Smith celebrates with his offensive line after the 49ers' first touchdown of the game. (AP)

Second Quarter

• Drew Brees helps his offensive line pass block because he's savvy in the pocket. A certain percentage of sacks can come from the quarterback's inability to adjust his position based on pressure; with Brees, that percentage is very low.

• So far this season, San Francisco has been sacked 20 more times than New Orleans. As a result, it seems that the 49ers have opted for a much more conservative defensive gameplan. They respect the Saints' o-line, so they might only bring 4 rushers. But they want to bring that fourth man from different areas while mixing up the coverage to counteract Brees' ability to read a defense.

• On screen passes, the defensive linemen are coached to remember that getting to the quarterback "is never that easy." With 9 minutes left in the quarter, the Saints defensive line apparently forgot this rule. Luckily, their linebacker corps was quick to recognize the screen and contribute to a San Francisco three-and-out.

• Jonathan Goodwin is injured for the 49ers, at least temporarily. San Francisco is already struggling to establish the run, and losing their starting center could be a crippling blow.

• San Francisco tried nearly everything on New Orleans' second scoring drive: stunts, blitzes, rushing defensive ends out of 9-techniques. None of it was able to slow the machine-like New Orleans offense, which leads the league in 10-play drives. Offensive line units take pride in being able to keep the other team's offense off the field, and the Saints have begun their ball-control onslaught.

• The Saints just unveiled their own taste of the screen, and the 49ers d-line did a much better job recognizing it than New Orleans' unit did earlier, adding fuel to the argument that San Francisco has a better-coached defense.

Above: Drew Brees' second-quarter scramble attampt didn't go as planned. (AP)

Third Quarter

• San Francisco relies on their offensive line's ability to cut defenders on perimeter run plays. During the 49ers' first drive of the second half, the Saints were still able to pursue well enough to stop Frank Gore for no gain despite the fact that most of their front seven were lying on the ground..

• For the second time in three plays, New Orleans brought seven rushers. It's obviously too much for the 49ers o-line to handle, but Alex Smith wasn't able to react quickly enough to avoid the sack.

• The Niners have yet to make anything happen on offense in the second half. Credit so far goes to the Saints defense, who has begun regularly bringing six or more rushers nearly every other play. The San Francisco o-line is handling the pressure admirably, but the 49ers skill players are struggling to make plays.

• San Francisco is playing some amazing coverage on defense. They only brought three rushers, which allowed to go through his progressing with a sundial timing him, and still managed to force an incomplete pass. So far this game, it seems that New Orleans is successful by blitzing more whereas San Francisco is successful by blitzing less.

• I began watching this game expecting an offensive line showdown. However, the story so far has been less about offensive line play and more about turnovers and dropped passes. Both teams are missing opportunities left and right; the team who comes out of this alive will be the one who shows a shred of consistency.

• Even with Goodwin back in the game at center, the 49ers still can't get any inside running game established because New Orleans is loading up the box and daring Alex Smith to make big-time throws. The Saints' problem on offense is exactly the opposite. San Fancisco is putting five defenders in the box and rushing only three. They're protecting themselves from the deep ball daring New Orleans to run the ball well without Pierre Thomas. So far, both plans are working quite well.

Above: Despite the Niners' refusal to rush many defenders, Justin Smith recorded a third-quarter sack. (AP)

Fourth Quarter

• The 49ers ran an incredibly effective d-line twist that made the Saints' left guard do a 360-degree spin. It got Justin Smith free to force an incompletion from Brees. San Francisco is expecting it to take a long time for their pass rush to get to Brees with only three or four rushers, so they're implementing more stunts and twists to try and confuse the Saints o-line.

• Justin Smith is an absolute animal. With the Niners only rushing three, Smith bull-rushed Jermon Bushrod directly into Brees. If San Francisco manages to win this game, it will be thanks to Smith and an exceptional defensive backfield.

• When the 49ers pull left guard Mike Iupati onto a linebacker, it's a huge mismatch because of his immense size. San Francisco's inside power runs have been some of their most successful ones today, and Frank Gore ripped off a 42-yard gain.

• I admittedly hadn't seen San Francisco play much this season, and I understand now why they have the top defense in the league. They can create pressure with only three or four rushers, and can play some amazing zone coverage. Most impressive is their ability to recognize New Orleans' plays and execute their assignments. The Saints' offensive line can't do much to win this game, because the Niners' defense is that good. It's by far one of the most-well coached defenses I've ever seen.

• And just like that, New Orleans flips the script. With five pass rushers in his face, Brees threw the checkdown to the speedy Darren Sproles, who was sprung by some great downfield blocking for a touchdown. The Saints' o-line has executed their assignment fairly well all game; all it took was a big play from their skill player cohorts, and New Orleans is up.

• Vernon Davis is one of the few NFL tight ends I've seen who can be split out at the Z, then beat a cornerback on a go route. Nice protection by San Francisco, great toss by Alex Smith, amazing speed from Davis.

• And now the game has devolved into utter chaos. Three touchdowns between the two teams, and both offensive lines managed to keep their composure despite the frantic atmosphere in San Francisco. The 49ers have an incredibly well-coached team that should take the Giants-Packers winner to the brink. Huge win.