The Walsh Method of Evaluating Offensive Tackles

A quick look at Bill Walsh's coaching tree is evidence enough of the late coach's football genius. The modern NFL owes much of its coaching philosophy to Walsh, and though he clearly shaped today's coaching landscape by forging efficient leaders, he is remembered mostly for his true genius on the chalkboard. Few coaches can claim to have changed the game as much as Walsh, who – along with Sam Wyche, George Seifert, and others – helped to shape the West Coast concepts that still flavor nearly every team's offensive playbook today.

Walsh is a celebrated coach indeed, yet one of his most admired qualities was a truly impressive ability to stay ahead of the curve. His 1998 book, Finding the Winning Edge, is still heralded as football's holy scripture mostly due to Walsh's incredibly detailed view of how to run a successful organization (though it is sadly now out of print). Many of his predictions about the modern NFL are spot on; for example, he wrote that many teams in the 90's shied away from a 3-4 defense, but argued that popularity of defensive systems is cyclical, so he expected teams to eventually return to the 3-4. (Which they most certainly did.)

He also led the way with extremely accurate and effective personnel evaluation. In Finding the Winning Edge, Walsh defined the exact characteristics a player needed to exhibit to enjoy success in his 49ers organization. Once I got my hands on a copy of the prolific tome, I was especially interested in his section on offensive linemen. Specifically, I was curious to see how this "Walsh Method" holds up in today's league, with today's linemen.


Walsh outlined the various strengths that he looked for in offensive tackles; are those same qualities as important in today's league?


For each position, I'll offer a summary of his argument, followed by my analysis of how it holds up in 2012. First in the series of posts is offensive tackle. Let's take a look:

Offensive Tackle

Walsh's take:

He acknowledges the increasing weight of tackles, but says that getting up to 330 pounds or more is unnecessary. Players who weigh that much "...play well in spite of weighing 330, not because of it. The only apparent benefit of weighing that much is to attract the attention of the television camera crew" (p. 125). There are certainly players in this weight range who are successful, but Walsh believes they might enhance their performance by dropping weight. His "ideal size" for a tackle is listed at 6'4", 310 pounds.

Bubba Paris is one of the examples Bill Walsh gives
 of an ideal offensive tackle.

According to Walsh, the one absolutely essential physical trait for this position is girth. (ed. note: "girth" is not defined explicitly by Walsh. My best definition is "having a naturally large bone structure, especially in the hips, thighs and shoulders.") Strength, agility and body control rank right underneath girth as priorities, not necessarily in that order.

Long arms are also important to gain leverage. A tackle's ability to move within a 2-yard by 2-yard box is critical since the large majority of their most important duties take place in that box. This can be coached to an extent, but players without natural ability in this box won't be able to accomplish as much.

Another aspect of the tackle's play that can be coached is the timing and execution of blocks, although once again, much of this comes naturally to a good player.

Next is adaptability. Walsh saw the 1990s as a new era in offensive line play, in that the increased complexity of NFL defenses meant the tackle now had to deal with three or four possible scenarios, whereas there used to be only one or two possibilities to anticipate. An example of this would be a LB blitzing from the outside while the DE who was expected to rush drops into coverage instead. The modern offensive tackle, Walsh argues, must be able to recognize these variations immediately and react accordingly.

The last key point Walsh makes about tackles is a psychological one. More than most of the other positions on the field, they must have an extremely high level of confidence and self-control in order to be able to stay composed when things go wrong on the field.

Analysis:

I could not agree with Walsh more on his last two points. A successful NFL offensive tackle must be incredibly smart and quick-thinking, yet highly stable psychologically. He can never be too "up" or "down." Whereas certain positions (mostly defensive) can just "get angry" and up their level of play, the offensive tackle will quickly make mistakes if he gets too amped – or conversely, dejected – and leaves his ideal mental zone.

Joe Thomas is a prime example of intelligence, adaptability,
 and agility at the tackle position in today's NFL.

Adaptability is even more important now than in 1998. Wide receivers are arguably more physically dominant today than they were when Walsh coached, so defenses rely on increased pressure to even the playing field. To do this, they throw increasingly complicated stems, stunts, and blitzes at the offensive line in an effort to confuse them and thus diminish the potential role of Calvin Johnson-esque receivers. Consequently, offensive linemen who are able to recognize and adapt to the plethora of defensive looks they see are more valuable than ever.

Their ability to recognize a blitz is important, but if they cannot physically match up with the agility of elite pass rushers, today's tackles are essentially useless. Pass protection schemes now often rely on sending a running back or tight end to "chip" a pass rusher (read: give him a shot right in the windpipe) before they head off into a route, thereby making the tackle's job easier. If an offense doesn't need to involve skill players in pass protection as much because their tackles are agile in that 2x2 yard box, then they have more freedom in their passing schemes.

Walsh's point on weight might be his most contentious, though. If he was correct that tackles didn't need to weigh 330 pounds back then, Since Finding the Winning Edge was published in 1998, the average weight of NFL offensive tackles ballooned up from 311 pounds to 320 in 2000. Since then, it has hovered around the 'teens and 20's. 

He lists the 1997 NFC Pro Bowlers as such:

Lomas Brown – Arizona Cardinals (6'4" 275 lbs.)

Willie Roaf – New Orleans Saints (6'5" 300 lbs.)

Erik Williams – Dallas Cowboys (6'6" 324 lbs.)

Now, here are the 2012 NFC Pro Bowlers:

Jason Peters – Philadelphia Eagles (6'4" 340 lbs.)

Joe Staley – San Francisco 49ers (6'5" 315 lbs.)

Jermon Bushrod – New Orleans Saints (6'5" 315 lbs.)

Granted, the sample size here is fairly small (the number of men, not the men themselves), so the heights and weights listed are not statistically significant. Nevertheless, we can see from the short list of gifted tackles who played 15 years apart – a long time in the NFL – that Walsh is correct in identifying natural girth as the most basic requirement of a great tackle. In today's game, a tackle under 6'4" has little chance of succeeding.  

But can weighing over 330 pounds be detrimental to a tackle's ultimate potential?

Jermon Bushrod - 6'5" 315 lbs.

Jason Peters - 6'4" 340 lbs.

Above are two of last year's Pro Bowlers. On the left is Jermon Bushrod, while Jason Peters is on the right. Keep in mind that both of these men are elite offensive tackles. Bushrod is slightly larger (1 inch taller, 10 pounds heavier) than Walsh's "ideal" tackle, while Peters is significantly heavier.

Both men are Pro Bowlers because they possess a natural girth in bone structure, and they developed power and agility over the course of their careers. Bushrod especially has long arms, which is advantageous because it allows him to create separation from defenders in pass protection.

The logical sequence for this analysis is to declare one of these players "better" than the other. However, I can't necessarily agree with Walsh's point. Having played every offensive line position at various weights, the best way I can sum up my modification of Walsh's argument is this:

In most cases, playing over 330 does not hurt a tackle's ultimate potential. It just makes him a different type of player.

For me (granted, a shorter player than either of the above gentlemen) it was difficult to really push linemen around at 250 or 260. Once I got up in the 285 range, run blocking became significantly easier. Conversely, my agility on downfield blocks was affected (you guessed it) negatively. Staying on linebackers once I reached them became more difficult. Blocking safeties and corners became a comically futile lumbering struggle.

Hence, playing at different weight levels creates a slightly different skill set based on the player. I'd be more likely to feature Bushrod in an offense with lots of zone rushing and bootlegs, so he could set the point on defensive ends and make blocks downfield. A player with Bushrod's build would generally also be the more agile pass protector, and would be more capable of taking on elite pass rushers without help from a tight end or running back. Conversely, Peters is more naturally suited for a power running game, yet that does not preclude him from being a great zone blocker or pass protector.


This brings me to what I see as Walsh's most important point, and that is the extent to which these various types of blocks come naturally to linemen. To give a personal example, I developed a natural feel for pass protection over time thanks to lots of coaching and countless reps in practice and games; it just made sense to me physically in a way that other types of blocking didn't. I never really figured out the footwork necessary to stay on downfield run blocks, despite intense study and repetition.


Therefore, I don't believe in Walsh's blanket statement that tackles weighing 330-plus should drop weight. For those who are naturally skilled in certain types of blocking, playing at a higher weight emphasizes their strengths and allows the offensive coordinator to lean upon those strengths in his gameplan. In today's league, 330 isn't nearly as massive as it was to Walsh in 1998. Yet other skills and values – mindset, adaptability, agility – are more important now than ever. It seems that once again, Walsh was ahead of the curve.

Using Empty Protection with a Y-Stick Concept

When teams choose to use empty protection in the pass game, the offensive line is under more pressure than usual. Essentially, empty pro (also sometimes referred to as "big on big") is a pass protection concept that only involves the offensive line.

Most pass plays involve an extra blocker; teams either keep the running back or tight end in to pass protect (or have him at least chip a defender while leaving for a route), or motion in a slotted tight end to help out. There are plenty of creative ways to protect the quarterback on pass plays, but empty protection is by far the riskiest.

That's why it's nice to tie empty protection in with a good route combination that will come open early, especially if the defense blitzes. The Y-Stick concept is popular among Air Raid and Pro Style offenses alike, and it's a perfect match with empty pro. Let's take a look at why this is so effective:

The video used in making these images is courtesy of ESPN.

This is the count of men in protection versus potential rushers. The running back will be free releasing for a potential checkdown throw, so it's five on five. This count doesn't necessarily have any correspondence, meaning offensive player #1 might not block defender #1.

This count simply allows the offensive line to say, "Here are the five guys we're prioritizing in our protection." They're the most immediate threats, which is why the center (blocker #3) points out the will linebacker (defender #5) rather than the backer next to him. #5 is the innermost defender that isn't actually on the line, so he's the most dangerous of the two inside linebackers.

Here are the route combos on the play. I drew up all the routes to show the concept in full, but we're most concerned about the circled player, or the Y. For terminology purposes, the Y is a tight end (in this case he's flexed out). Some teams might call this guy an "A" rather than a Y, but that's a semantics discussion that doesn't really need to take place here.

As you can see, the cornerbacks are playing off their receivers; this means the defense could be playing man coverage or cover 4 zone, but the coverage hasn't really been tipped yet. However, they don't appear to be looking at the quarterback; rather, the corners and safeties seem focused on individual threats. This would indicate man coverage, but we can't be completely sure before the play starts.

This is called a "Y-Stick" concept because the circled Y is running a stick route. He's driving just past five yards, then making a speed break inside to face the quarterback while still moving towards the sideline. The Y-Stick and the release from the running back combine to work well with empty protection.

The quarterback's read is fairly simple. If the defense brings the house, throw the Y-stick immediately. If the Y is covered but there's still a considerable rush, throw the drag or dump the ball off to the running back. If the defense doesn't bring many rushers, wait for one of the developing routes to come open.

Just prior to the snap, the Will linebacker (who was #5 in the rush count) walks up to the line. This keeps him as a top-priority potential rusher. Had the Mike backer (the circled player) walked up instead, he would have replaced his cohort in the offensive line's presnap count.

However, the Mike's weight is pretty heavy on his toes; he definitely looks ready to blitz as well. The offensive line and the quarterback see this, but for now they're more concerned with the players in the yellow square.

The o-line doesn't have too many rules on this protection, except to block the first five rushers inside-out. This means inside rushers are a greater threat because they're closer to the quarterback. If a sixth rusher comes, the offensive line can't do anything; the quarterback has to recognize the extra rusher and throw to the (presumably) open receiver.

Here's the same play from an endzone angle right after the snap. The left tackle #59 recognizes that, in fact, both linebackers have decided to blitz. He leaves the defensive end that was lined up outside of him, because by the time that defensive end makes it to the quarterback the ball will be out.

The left guard (#73) and center (#57) are preparing to pass twisting pass rushers to each other. The rushers might have lined up in one gap, but by looping and changing their route to the quarterback, they hope to create confusion among the o-line and break one of their rushers free. #73 and #57 need to work together in order to ensure they both block the man who ends up in their respective areas.

Here is the play a split-second later, right before the quarterback makes his throw. The left side of the offensive line has done an admirable job adjusting to the blitz.

Since the defense ended up playing man coverage, the right defensive end dropped off to cover the running back. As a result, the right tackle (#70) is coming back inside to help. Pass protection is all about "bumping" your fellow offensive lineman off a player so that he can take someone else. #70 is hoping to bump the right guard (#64) off to the blitzing linebacker.

Meanwhile, the left tackle (#59) and left guard (#73) picked up the twisting players and allowed the outermost rusher to come unblocked, since he won't get to the quarterback before the ball is out. The center (#53) is passing off a defensive lineman to #73, then getting ready to pick up the late blitzing backer.

In a perfect world, everyone on the o-line would have ended up taking the man to his left; however, this is still a very good empty pass pro adjustment. #70 had no way of knowing the defensive end would drop in coverage, and in a quick passing situation the offensive line would rather block the man to the Y-Stick side so he can't jump up to bat the ball down.

Before any blitzers can arrive, the ball is already out. This is an excellent play to accommodate the blitz, because it gives the quarterback plenty of quick options without having to keep an extra player in protection. His first two choices here would be the Y-Stick and the drag coming from the left slot player, with the running back's free release established as a third choice checkdown route.

Since the defense had a man blitz on, throwing the Y-stick is an obvious decision. The defender manned up on the Y was a safety; as you can see in the above image, he's five yards away, allowing the receiver to get a first down.

Empty protection is perfect for quick passing concepts like the Y-stick, since it gives the quarterback a couple of seconds while allowing for more passing options. However, the offensive line's empty protection needs to be as good as Houston's on this specific play. The unit must be saavy enough to read pre-play keys, then react to twists and late blitzes. If the o-line is capable, this protection/route concept is a great addition to any offense.

Beyond the Wildcat: The Single Wing's Potential Role in Modern Football

The single wing is similar to the flexbone in that it allows high school and college coaches to get the most out of versatile personnel. The triple option requires a fast, smart quarterback who can make split-second decisions that are (more often than not) correct.

Likewise, the single wing requires a superstar fullback who can essentially “do it all”. Plenty of high schools still run the single wing, but it is often regarded as a gimmicky offense that relies on a defense’s inability to prepare. However, at the higher levels of football, nearly all hints of the single wing disappeared for many years.

The La Center High School Wildcats in Washington used a single wing derivative offense in the late ‘90s, which essentially began the tradition of “Wildcat” offensive formations in football. Gus Malzahn and David Lee made the wildcat fairly well-known around 2006 while they were offensive coordinators at Arkansas.

Above: The Miami Dolphins brought the Wildcat to the NFL, but they haven't done much with it since.

The formation exploded in popularity when Lee took a QB coach job with the Miami Dolphins and helped them incorporate the Wildcat. Beginning in the third game of that season, the Dolphins deployed the new aspect of their offense with great success. Since then, the Wildcat has spread across the NFL and the NCAA; nowadays it is expected of a coaching staff to have a Wildcat package to diversify their offensive attacks.

In my opinion, most coaches view the Wildcat as trendy and necessary, but they use it halfheartedly. It is a situational formation for most teams, and many NFL clubs deploy it maybe two plays per game. Thus, I believe that more Wildcat innovation could (and should) be the next major trend in football at all levels. As it stands, the base Wildcat formation looks like this for most college and NFL teams:

The play almost invariably starts with a jet sweep motion from the left wingback, or a zone read involving the left running back. The RB behind the center catches the snap, gives or fakes the jet sweep, and then runs right or left. He might have the option to throw the ball downfield, but rarely does (because he is a running back). I don’t understand why there is such a lack in creativity coming from a formation that is essentially limitless.

Teams also tend to leave their original quarterback split out at wide receiver even if they didn’t start the play with him behind center (followed by a shift). I understand an offensive coordinator would want the element of surprise – quarterback heads out towards the sideline when the huddle breaks – but at that point he becomes a useless player. I would rather sacrifice the slight advantage in making defenders react quickly to the formation change, because I prefer having the advantage of a player who can actually contribute on the play.

I believe that a more “throwback” single wing formation can be utilized in a way that also encompasses the more modern aspects of football. First off, the formation would look like this:

Above is a more traditional single wing formation. It may seem somewhat out of date even to coaches using the Wildcat, but I believe it can have a place in football. First, one of the two “running backs” behind center should be the actual quarterback; he should be able to keep the ball on passing plays so the offense doesn’t ever rely on less-skilled passers.

The quarterback and tailback are split; no one is directly behind the center. This isn't a problem, as any college or NFL center worth his salt would be able to complete a directional snap with just a bit of practice. This split look can create an advantage with an unbalanced line, placing either the quarterback or runningback into a more favorable position behind additional blockers.

This base formation can actually do quite a bit if emphasis is placed on different motions and play fakes in order to get a numerical advantage over the defense. The defense might see this offensive set and shift to account for its absurd stack to the right, but I would suggest creative motioning (wingbacks, fullbacks, even tackles) in order to outnumber the defense for power runs and jet sweeps. The zone read even fits nicely here.

I believe that as a football philosophy, the Wildcat is underutilized and lacking in creativity. Considering that teams have used draft picks on athletic quarterbacks that could be "a wildcat guy," startlingly few of these players are used with any effectiveness when they truly could be effective. Why spend a draft pick on a guy who plays maybe a snap or two, and doesn't even play on special teams units?

A formation such as the one above could be advantageous for offenses, but only if teams buy into using it as a significant aspect of their offense. Part of the problem with Wildcat packages now is that they receive little practice time, and therefore little trust during a game’s crucial moments. I hope and expect that this will change fairly soon.

Goodell's lengthened reign will be littered with tough decisions

Pittsburgh Steelers linebacker James Harrison told Men’s Journal last July he wouldn’t piss on National Football League Commissioner Roger Goodell if the man was on fire. Harrison’s teammate, Ryan Clark, recently told CBS Sports “I’m not going to sit across from [Goodell] unless they handcuff me. Which is probably the next step anyway.”

Goodell is clearly reviled by the players he oversees, but apparently that doesn’t bother team owners in the slightest.

Above: It could be a long road ahead for Goodell and Player's Association leader DeMaurice Smith.

The NFL recently announced it would extend his contract through March 2019. Although he was incredibly unpopular with fans and players during the 4 ½ month lockout, Goodell helped the organization through difficult times to see of its most financially successful seasons ever.

The league’s triumph this year was evident in its TV numbers. 23 of the 25 highest-rated television broadcasts last fall were NFL games, and as a result total NFL national media revenues might reach $7 billion annually thanks to a 60% price hike for rights to televise games. Not too shabby from our boy Roger.

There’s a blindingly bright economic future in store for the NFL, but if the next seven years sound like a breeze for Goodell, they won’t be.

Assuming that America isn’t ruled by the Chinese and/or cyborgs by March 2019, the NFL could potentially have much more trouble at hand than another looming collective bargaining agreement.

Though the league will most likely continue to teeter on borderline class warfare between highly compensated athletes and grossly overcompensated owners, the biggest issue threatening the league’s future prosperity is its ambivalence about player safety.

Above: James Harrison was fined and suspended one game for this hit on Colt McCoy. Should he have been?

In an attempt to promote player safety, the NFL recently began fining pros for what it sees as violations of its “Player Safety Rules.” These fines include, but are not limited to, horse collar tackles, late hits, spearing, blindside blocks, low blocks, hits on defenseless players, and “Impermissible Use of the Helmet.”

The problem with many of these fines is that their corresponding violations are not black and white. For example, a facemask penalty is easily definable; the offender either grabs another player’s facemask or he doesn’t.

Hits on defenseless players aren’t so clear-cut, since “defenseless” is a relatively subjective term. When a defender gets ready to hit a receiver coming across the middle, the receiver might reach and miss the ball a split-second before the defender arrives. That defender cannot be expected to change his course of action within an impossibly small time frame.

Furthermore, many of these calls are at the referee’s discretion.  Defensive players are often found guilty of “impermissible use of the helmet” penalties and fines for hitting a running back head-on. This is an especially serious problem, since many times the defender’s helmet is placed properly; the running back lowers his helmet to strive for a few more yards, yet his team gets a 15-yard advantage for the “penalty”.


Fines are levied if the league reviews a play and finds that an athlete is violating their safety rules. Most players find Goodell's paycheck cleaver unjust, and none seem determined to change the way they play.

Above: Ray Lewis says his $20,000 fine won't affect how he plays football.

I think the thing is, you definitely respect them trying to protect players' safety, but at the same time, it won't change the way I play in this league, no matter what the fine is," Baltimore Ravens linebacker Ray Lewis told the Baltimore Sun after he received a $20,000 fine. "If the receiver has the ball, it's your job to disengage him from the ball."


The problem at hand is that Goodell et al want to stave off any criticism from those who believe football is dangerous by dispensing annoying (but not livelihood-threatening) punishments. Football can be hazardous, but NFL players aren't held in the league against their will. The game is high-risk with vast rewards, and every last athlete understands the tradeoff.


Slapping fines on players won't do anything but anger them further. Either make serious, sport-altering rule changes -- which would most likely hurt football's popularity -- or let the game be played the way it was before Goodell arrived as commissioner. The NFL is a big business with willing participants. Like any healthy corporate environment, there shouldn't be any grey areas.

Super Bowl XLVI: O-Line/D-Line Preview

The Super Bowl always receives significantly more media attention than necessary for any football game, so I don't even plan to talk about the rehashed plot lines. The Tom Brady et al are out for revenge story is incredibly lame, since (as Deadspin already pointed out) "There are precisely seven players on New England's roster who were there in 2008, and 16 on New York's." Most people just play along with the media crazies, enjoying the ride and preparing for Sunday.


On this blog, however, most of the anticipation comes from seeing a battle between two teams' offensive and defensive lines. These groups are incredibly skilled, but in different styles of play. Let's take a look at what makes these four units special, and what keys they'll be focusing on Sunday:

Above: Chris Snee and company will need to minimize Vince Wilfork's impact to maintain drives.

First up, the New York Giants' front five. These guys are (and have been, for years) all about the power running game. New York has a very blue-collar attitude on the o-line, which is fitting considering the fact that their jerseys indeed have blue collars.


They're quick enough to execute pulling blocks, but big and strong enough (average weight: 308) to make their down blocks effective. This combination of strength and speed in a power scheme gives the G-men's bruising running back tandem enough room to rip off huge gains.


This unit has played exceptionally well, considering they cut tackle Shawn Andrews, guard Rich Seubert, and center Shaun O'Hara in the offseason. Will Beatty stepped up at left tackle this season after starting only two games in 2010, and New York landed a major free agent in former 49ers center David Baas.


The Giants will be looking to their o-line to chew up clock and keep the explosive Patriots' offense off the field. They also should expect blitzes from New England to overcompensate for a dreadful secondary. Give #10 enough time and he should be able to pick them apart.


The two star o-linemen for New York are guards Chris Snee and David Diehl (right and left, respectively), who will attempt to stop the Patriots' best defensive weapon:

Above: If the Pats make a play on defense Sunday, chances are Wilfork will have had a hand in it.

Vince Wilfork is the Patriots' d-line. He had a monster season in 2011, with 52 total tackles, 3.5 sacks and two (two!) interceptions. However, most of his dominance lies outside the stat line. 


Even on plays where he doesn't make the tackle, Wilfork can absolutely demolish an o-line's blocking scheme by driving the center and/or guard into the backfield immediately. He doesn't have an amazing overall pass rush, but when he uses his bull rush move he can be devastating to opposing offenses.


Baas will have his hands full the entire game trying to deal with Wilfork, and it's a matchup I've been anticipating. It's always interesting to see how centers try to minimize Wilfork's impact, but based on the big-time game Wilfork had in the AFC Championship, Snee and Diehl will also need to share the workload.

Above: They might look a bit grungy, but the Patriots o-line is exceptional at pass blocking.

Next up, the Patriots o-line. This is one of the best pass blocking units I've ever seen, led by a virtually impenetrable left side consisting of Pro Bowl guard Logan Mankins and tackle Matt Light. Mankins can legitimately do it all, as he showed in the AFC Championship Game when he pulled around to the right side and cleared out two linebackers for a Patriots touchdown. Right guard Brian Waters was also voted into the Pro Bowl this season.


This o-line runs the zone fairly well, but their primary job is to give #12 time in the pocket. This became painfully evident to the Denver Broncos in the divisional round, when their Pro Bowl pass rush tandem of Von Miller and Elvis Dumervil didn't manage a single sack. Of course, Denver's hapless Brian Dawkins-less safeties allowed New England to use their quick game passing the entire night. But even when Denver brought the house on blitzes, the Patriots o-line managed to create enough time for completions.


The matchup I have been looking forward to the most for Super Bowl XLVI is the New England o-line's pass protection against the New York Giants' d-line. 

Above: Look for Jason Pierre-Paul to take advantage of Nate Solder's inexperience.

New York's only Pro Bowler other than Eli Manning is second-year phenom defensive end Jason Pierre-Paul. JP-P is mirrored by a productive Justin Tuck, and the two have combined for 21.5 sacks this season. Add in Linval Joseph and Chris Canty on the interior, and you've got an o-lineman's nightmare.


I expect Light to be able to manage either one of these ends, but Pats rookie right tackle Nate Solder (a first round pick, but still inexperienced) has been somewhat inconsistent this season. He notably struggled against Cameron Wake when New England played Miami early this season, and Wake's pass rushing style is similar to that of Pierre-Paul.


If Solder can't protect in the game's crucial moments, the Giants' d-line will be able to put a damper on New England's hypersonic offense (much like what they did to Green Bay in the NFC Championship). The same will occur for the Giants' offense if Snee, Baas, and Diehl cannot contain Wilfork. Either way, the o-line/d-line matchup this week is definitely one of super proportions.

Chalk Talk: Installing Urban Meyer's Offense at Ohio State

Ohio State landed the white whale of dodgy coaching candidates by introducing Urban Meyer as head coach on November 28. More recently, talk concerning Meyer often includes the phrase, "game-changer";   he's landed several recruiting coups, most notably Colorado 4-star offensive lineman Joey O'Connor, who decided that attending Penn State wasn't the best idea post-scandal. By the end of last week, Meyer's recruiting class rank had climbed to #3 overall.

Lately, Buckeye fans have been drooling about how well Braxton Miller could run Meyer's offense, and it certainly seems as though Miller and Meyer is a match made in heaven (not unlike Tim Tebow's past prowess in the system). However, the offense's success next season will hinge more on the offensive line's ability to learn and execute the blocking concepts properly. Here's an example of what frosh linemen like O'Connor might be expected to do next season:

The video used in making these images is courtesy of CBS.

This shovel option play is from Florida's 2009 SEC Championship loss to Alabama. The game has since been marked by some as the beginning of the end for Meyer in Florida; the Gators still made a BCS bowl that season, but things would never be the same as they were during Tim Tebow's college heyday.

Tebow will fake the jet sweep, then run left with the option to pitch to his running back, shovel pass to his tight end (who will run in front of Tebow), or keep the ball himself. The blocking is diagrammed above. The left guard and tackle will leave the defensive end as the option man, and will instead double team the noseguard up to the backside backer. The center will block down on the 3-technique while the right guard pulls for the playside backer.

The right tackle has the most difficult block on this play, because he has to essentially account for two defenders. The center has a long way to go since the guard is leaving, and if the center doesn't get to the defensive tackle quickly enough, the d-tackle will disrupt the tight end's ability to get in position for a possible shovel pass. The right tackle also cannot let the defensive end (lined up over the tight end) run free, or else he will spoil the play. 

Therefore, the right tackle must step left to secure the center's block, then hinge right to block the defensive end. This is an incredibly difficult thing to ask of a tackle against such an athletic defense. Ideally, the fake jet sweep would keep the defensive end guessing long enough for the right tackle to get him, but there's no guarantee the fake will help.

At the snap of the ball, the blocking seems to be developing fairly well. The playside double team is underway, and the right guard has begun to pull. The center has secured his defensive tackle, so now the right tackle can hinge for his defensive end. The question is whether he can hinge quickly enough.

Four of the five linemen are executing their assignments properly, but that won't be enough. The right guard is almost up to the playside backer, and the double team has been executed perfectly, with one lineman already headed for the backside backer. The center is still on his block, as well.

Unfortunately for the right tackle, Tebow's fake jet sweep didn't deter the defensive end from crashing into the backfield. The right tackle tried to hinge quickly enough to get the defensive end, but was a mere split-second too late.

Now the defensive end is tailing the tight end, so the play is over already unless Alabama tackles poorly. Meyer's shovel option is predicated on getting a mismatch of players; if there were three offensive players (Tebow, running back, tight end) and only two defenders to account for them (playside defensive end, safety), the play would have a chance to be successful. Yet now the backside defensive end is here to account for the tight end. Any choice Tebow makes at this point will be the wrong one.

Tebow has decided to shovel the ball, and the defensive end trailing Tebow's tight end immediately makes the tackle.

Blown plays like this were fairly common by the end of Meyer's tenure at Florida. In order to be successful at Ohio State, Meyer needs to continue recruiting athletic linemen such as Joey O'Connor who can be taught to execute difficult blocks such as the right tackle's assignment from this play. Meyer's offense asks quite a bit of its offensive linemen, and talented players such as the Pouncey brothers are required to ensure its success. Braxton Miller will most likely be a huge star running Meyer's system, but he needs a star cast of offensive linemen in order to accomplish the task.

Chalk Talk: Playing Offensive Line in the Triple Option

In my 13 years playing offensive line, I took part in several offensive systems throughout high school and college: pro-style, spread, pistol, and even a variation of West Virginia's offense called the "shot-run." Yet one of the most fun systems to play o-line in was undoubtedly the triple option.

I reported for my first training camp at Colorado College in August 2008. The Tigers' offensive coordinator left during the offseason to take the head coaching job at Grinnell, which is actually where I ended up once Colorado College cut football. Anyway, while meeting my fellow freshmen football players for the first time, I heard rumblings that we were going to run "the triple option."

I was coming from a high school where we were in the shotgun 95% of the time, and using 5-wide sets for at least a third of our plays. This was during a magical time when coaches across the country thought the spread offense couldn't be stopped. Unicorns danced in fields made of rainbows and puppy smiles. I liked playing o-line in the spread, and the pressure of passing on most plays developed in me an unflappable confidence in pass protection. I hadn't even heard of the triple option.

Our rival high school ran a bastardized double-tight version of the flexbone which we affectionately referred to as "the turtle," but I didn't know that it was actually an abomination derived from Paul Johnson's triple option. In the coming weeks and months, I would come to simultaneously revile and enjoy playing in the sweet simplicity of the triple option.

What's so great about playing in an offense that passes the football maybe three times a game, you ask? You can absolutely terrorize the defensive linemen.

Ask any d-lineman who has played against the triple option, and he will tell you he absolutely hates it; he will also probably call it stupid, because he doesn't want to say he is afraid of it. Offensive linemen have three jobs on the base triple option play: cut a d-lineman, double-team a d-lineman, or cut a linebacker. (a cut block is aimed at the defender's knees with the intention of getting them to fall down.)

At Colorado College, we literally used our entire practice time practicing these three blocks. It gets ingrained in the very fiber of your being, to the point where all you have to think about before a snap is how you are going to ruin your defender's world.

Did I mention we played out of a four-point stance? On passing plays, we actually had to take a step forward before we could start our pass blocking. When a defensive lineman is uncertain of whether he is going to be double-teamed or cut, he can't play to the best of his ability. I prided myself in causing these d-linemen to live in fear. I was a football terrorist, and I loved it.

Let's take a look at what makes the base play of the triple option so simple for offensive linemen.

The video footage used in making these images is courtesy of ESPN.

This is Air Force, who is located in the same city as Colorado College. Their offense rushed for over 314 yards per game (third in the nation). The quarterback reads the second man on or outside the center, which in this case is the defensive end. Therefore, the right tackle won't even worry about him; instead, he will slam down on the 3-technique with the guard, with the intent of working up to the playside linebacker.

The center and left guard will execute scoop blocks. They will take at least three steps at a 45-degree angle to the right; if the noseguard stays where he is the guard will cut him while the center goes downfield to cut the flowing linebacker.

The left tackle's job is essentially to keep the 5-technique lined up on his outside shoulder from making a play. Any line-of-scrimmage players outside the 5-tech are too far away to make a play if the quarterback hands off to the fullback.

After the first step, everything is going fairly well. The left guard is in the process of cutting the nose while the center works up to the backside linebacker, and the frontside double-team is nearly underway. The quarterback already has his eyes on the defensive end in order to see whether he should give the ball up the middle or keep it.

All blocks are developing flawlessly. You can see that the left tackle's assignment is too busy trying not to get cut to pursue after the play. Meanwhile, the #1 option player has come down to tackle the fullback, so the quarterback is pulling the ball to keep his second and third options alive (keep it or pitch it).

The play has devolved into absolute carnage at the line of scrimmage, which is exactly what the offensive linemen want. It is a hallmark of this offense to be able to get your skill players in space with defenders who could potentially make mistakes. To be clear, the offensive linemen have no idea whether the ball will be given, kept, or pitched on this play. They simply execute their assignment and let the brains of the offense (the quarterback) call all the shots. It's a very blue-collar type of football to play o-line in; just punch the timeclock and beat the crap out of defenders.

The triple option is all about getting the defenders to second-guess themselves, and this play does so perfectly. The circled defender is supposed to follow the pitch man, but with the quarterback running straight at him, he hesitates. The resulting pitch goes for a touchdown.

Of course, this isn't the only play in the triple option; however, defenses think they can stop it by assigning defenders specific roles against this play. As Chris Brown has pointed out, this doesn't work. A triple-option guru can just change the blocking assignments. As an offensive lineman, you just do what they tell you. It's nice being able to turn your brain off (or at least down a little) while playing football.

In the interest of full disclosure, our offense was absolutely terrible that season. Attempting to run the triple option with spread personnel is insanely difficult; it requires lots of time drilling the concepts into players. Especially crucial is having a quarterback who is comfortable making the split-second decisions crucial to the offense's success. However, as an o-lineman, it was rather pleasant just focusing on hitting people as hard as possible. Offenses where I was actually required to think before plays were more rewarding, but this one was pretty damn fun.

O-Line Game Notes: New Orleans at San Francisco

Photo courtesy of the Associated Press.

Venturing cautiously from their precious dome for the first time in a month, the New Orleans Saints traveled to San Francisco this week for the NFC's most anticipated postseason matchup thus far.

From an offensive line standpoint, both teams protect well on blitzing downs. San Francisco has the league's third highest passer rating against the blitz, whereas New Orleans is number five. Let's take a look at how the two units executed their respective gameplans today:


First Quarter 

• With nearly 4:30 remaining in the quarter, Roman Harper blitzed off the right side. There weren't enough blockers to pick Harper up, making him the "hot" blitzer. Alex Smith wasn't able to throw hot off of Harper, resulting in a fumble and a fight between San Francisco's offensive line and New Orleans' defensive line. This kind of chippiness early on can become extreme as the game wears on.

• Vernon Davis scored on a 49-yard reception with 2:08 left in the first quarter. The Saints brought some forceful inside stunts designed to get the San Francisco's interior o-line on different levels so that rushing lanes would be available. The 49ers did a great job picking up the stunts, and Smith had ample time to throw.

• New Orleans managed to pick up the 49ers second corner blitz in a row, but even after stepping up in the pocket, Brees threw a route that got jumped by Goldson. The 49ers' second takeaway is thanks to masked coverage rather than a good blitz.

• The broadcasters praised Frank Gore's pass protection on Smith's second touchdown pass with 0:41 remaining, and for good reason. Running backs are rarely asked to protect the opposite side of where they start the play, but Gore did so admirably against Will Smith.

Above: Alex Smith celebrates with his offensive line after the 49ers' first touchdown of the game. (AP)

Second Quarter

• Drew Brees helps his offensive line pass block because he's savvy in the pocket. A certain percentage of sacks can come from the quarterback's inability to adjust his position based on pressure; with Brees, that percentage is very low.

• So far this season, San Francisco has been sacked 20 more times than New Orleans. As a result, it seems that the 49ers have opted for a much more conservative defensive gameplan. They respect the Saints' o-line, so they might only bring 4 rushers. But they want to bring that fourth man from different areas while mixing up the coverage to counteract Brees' ability to read a defense.

• On screen passes, the defensive linemen are coached to remember that getting to the quarterback "is never that easy." With 9 minutes left in the quarter, the Saints defensive line apparently forgot this rule. Luckily, their linebacker corps was quick to recognize the screen and contribute to a San Francisco three-and-out.

• Jonathan Goodwin is injured for the 49ers, at least temporarily. San Francisco is already struggling to establish the run, and losing their starting center could be a crippling blow.

• San Francisco tried nearly everything on New Orleans' second scoring drive: stunts, blitzes, rushing defensive ends out of 9-techniques. None of it was able to slow the machine-like New Orleans offense, which leads the league in 10-play drives. Offensive line units take pride in being able to keep the other team's offense off the field, and the Saints have begun their ball-control onslaught.

• The Saints just unveiled their own taste of the screen, and the 49ers d-line did a much better job recognizing it than New Orleans' unit did earlier, adding fuel to the argument that San Francisco has a better-coached defense.

Above: Drew Brees' second-quarter scramble attampt didn't go as planned. (AP)

Third Quarter

• San Francisco relies on their offensive line's ability to cut defenders on perimeter run plays. During the 49ers' first drive of the second half, the Saints were still able to pursue well enough to stop Frank Gore for no gain despite the fact that most of their front seven were lying on the ground..

• For the second time in three plays, New Orleans brought seven rushers. It's obviously too much for the 49ers o-line to handle, but Alex Smith wasn't able to react quickly enough to avoid the sack.

• The Niners have yet to make anything happen on offense in the second half. Credit so far goes to the Saints defense, who has begun regularly bringing six or more rushers nearly every other play. The San Francisco o-line is handling the pressure admirably, but the 49ers skill players are struggling to make plays.

• San Francisco is playing some amazing coverage on defense. They only brought three rushers, which allowed to go through his progressing with a sundial timing him, and still managed to force an incomplete pass. So far this game, it seems that New Orleans is successful by blitzing more whereas San Francisco is successful by blitzing less.

• I began watching this game expecting an offensive line showdown. However, the story so far has been less about offensive line play and more about turnovers and dropped passes. Both teams are missing opportunities left and right; the team who comes out of this alive will be the one who shows a shred of consistency.

• Even with Goodwin back in the game at center, the 49ers still can't get any inside running game established because New Orleans is loading up the box and daring Alex Smith to make big-time throws. The Saints' problem on offense is exactly the opposite. San Fancisco is putting five defenders in the box and rushing only three. They're protecting themselves from the deep ball daring New Orleans to run the ball well without Pierre Thomas. So far, both plans are working quite well.

Above: Despite the Niners' refusal to rush many defenders, Justin Smith recorded a third-quarter sack. (AP)

Fourth Quarter

• The 49ers ran an incredibly effective d-line twist that made the Saints' left guard do a 360-degree spin. It got Justin Smith free to force an incompletion from Brees. San Francisco is expecting it to take a long time for their pass rush to get to Brees with only three or four rushers, so they're implementing more stunts and twists to try and confuse the Saints o-line.

• Justin Smith is an absolute animal. With the Niners only rushing three, Smith bull-rushed Jermon Bushrod directly into Brees. If San Francisco manages to win this game, it will be thanks to Smith and an exceptional defensive backfield.

• When the 49ers pull left guard Mike Iupati onto a linebacker, it's a huge mismatch because of his immense size. San Francisco's inside power runs have been some of their most successful ones today, and Frank Gore ripped off a 42-yard gain.

• I admittedly hadn't seen San Francisco play much this season, and I understand now why they have the top defense in the league. They can create pressure with only three or four rushers, and can play some amazing zone coverage. Most impressive is their ability to recognize New Orleans' plays and execute their assignments. The Saints' offensive line can't do much to win this game, because the Niners' defense is that good. It's by far one of the most-well coached defenses I've ever seen.

• And just like that, New Orleans flips the script. With five pass rushers in his face, Brees threw the checkdown to the speedy Darren Sproles, who was sprung by some great downfield blocking for a touchdown. The Saints' o-line has executed their assignment fairly well all game; all it took was a big play from their skill player cohorts, and New Orleans is up.

• Vernon Davis is one of the few NFL tight ends I've seen who can be split out at the Z, then beat a cornerback on a go route. Nice protection by San Francisco, great toss by Alex Smith, amazing speed from Davis.

• And now the game has devolved into utter chaos. Three touchdowns between the two teams, and both offensive lines managed to keep their composure despite the frantic atmosphere in San Francisco. The 49ers have an incredibly well-coached team that should take the Giants-Packers winner to the brink. Huge win.

How the Denver Broncos can succeed long-term with Tim Tebow

How will Tebow keep winning long-term?
Hint: JD Walton plays an important role.

Over 2000 years after His arrival on earth, there is still a debate about whether Jesus Christ is the Jewish Messiah foretold in the Old Testament.

It seems the disputation of whether Tim Tebow is the savior of Denver's Super Bowl hopes might last nearly as long.

The arguments have been hashed and rehashed to the point of white noise; it's the classic he's a winner, bro vs. he doesn't make mid-range throws any respectable QB should be able to complete. Nearly every time the man exits the postgame podium, talk-radio fires are stoked once more.

So, to avoid redundancy about whether the Broncos should keep Tim Tebow long-term, let's just talk about what they need to do if they decide to ride the Tebow Train to Super Bowl glory or utter oblivion.

If John Elway & Co. ™ do indeed buy into Tebow for the foreseeable future, they must buy in all the way. No more straddling the fence with cryptic interview answers about Tebow's future. If he's the guy, start acting like it. This starts and ends with personnel. Elway and GM Brian Xanders must look for offensive personnel that fit neatly into Mike McCoy's Tebow-ized zone-read and zone-option scheme. Finding great fits requires thinking outside the box. For example, a happy accident for this offense is Demaryius Thomas.

Thomas was Josh McDaniels' first pick in the 2010 NFL Draft. At the time, he was just the safer option over Dez Bryant, who had character questions coming into the draft. A few questions were raised about drafting a receiver who played in the triple option at Georgia Tech. However, Thomas ended up being a perfect match for McCoy's new offense because of his time at Georgia Tech.

Demaryius Thomas was a triple option wide receiver, which makes him perfect for Denver.

Receivers in Paul Johnson's triple option spend the entire game stalk blocking corners and safeties, and then they go deep for a couple touchdowns per game. Coaches recruit receivers to triple option schools by saying, "you might only catch 2 balls a game, but it will be for 150 yards and 2 touchdowns because you'll be that open." Thomas' stat line from last week's Wild Card win over Pittsburgh? 4 catches for 204 yards and a touchdown. He gets his chance on deep play-action passes, and he does not disappoint.

The most important offensive personnel to find, though? More guys like Zane Beadles and JD Walton. McDaniels' second and third round picks from the 2010 Draft (McDaniels is looking pretty smart now, right?), they were solid offensive linemen who didn't require first-round money to obtain. If Denver scouts can identify more linemen that would be comfortable in this offensive system, those same linemen will likely be undervalued by other teams because they don't fit as well in a pro-style scheme.

Tim Tebow would be the first to admit his success is impossible without the young Denver o-line.

Tebow is admittedly a master at running the zone-read option. He faked the handoff to Willis McGahee so well last Sunday that it took Steelers LB James Harrison ridiculously long to realize Tebow still had the ball. (If WR Matt Willis had stayed on his block, that play would have been a touchdown.) However, the scheme would blow up in Tebow's face every play were it not for the superb blocking of Denver's offensive line. The organization has a long-held tradition of great offensive line play by undervalued players, and McCoy's offense offers an amazing possibility to keep this tradition going. The Broncos do need to develop run blocking from their tight ends, who currently struggle with staying on their blocks.

The last step? Continue developing the defensive backfield. Denver has a pass-rushing duo in Elvis Dumervil and Von Miller that will terrorize opposing offensive lines for years to come, but when the rush doesn't come immediately the Broncos' safeties are picked apart. This is in part because rookies Quinton Carter and Rahim Moore are experiencing an oft-unpleasant trial by fire. Both show flashes of brilliance followed by frustrating mental mistakes. Denver must develop these young players, and draft young talent to develop underneath Champ Bailey and Andre Goodman (both age 33), who have been stellar but will eventually retire.

In short, success is absolutely possible with Tebow. Denver has defied all odds and can continue to do so, but they must commit fully one way or the other. Embrace McCoy's collegiate scheme and develop the personnel to run it, or scrap everything and go back to a pro-style offense. Either choice is understandable, but the Broncos will drown if they refuse to commit one way or the other. It is an incredible risk to bank on Tebow's success, as it puts the careers of nearly everyone associated with the program in jeopardy if he fails. Having said that, if I had to bet my career on one player, it would undoubtedly be Tebow.

Chalk Talk: Understanding the National Championship in one play

On Monday, I talked about how offensive line play would determine the outcome of the National Championship Game. It was a showdown of the nation's top two defenses, certainly; but victory would go to the team whose offensive line made a dent in the opposing defense.

Down 15-0 in the desperate half of the fourth quarter, LSU started throwing haymakers. Facing a long fourth down, it was do-or-die time for the Tigers' offensive line, and they apparently decided to die.

Video used in making these images is courtesy of ESPN.

Jordan Jefferson just threw hot off an extra blitzer on the previous play and missed his receiver, so now the Tigers are calling a more conservative protection. They have six players to block six potential rushers. First, let's talk about the left side.

Because the running back has been placed on the left side, that will be the "man" side, meaning that the left guard and left tackle are manned up on the first and second pass rushers, respectively. The running back's job is to take the circled backer if he blitzes, or help the guard and tackle with their protection if the backer doesn't blitz. Sometimes the play will be called so the running back releases in a checkdown route if there is no extra blitzer.

On the right side, LSU also has three blockers for three potential rushers: the defensive tackle, the defensive end (who is actually a linebacker in a 3-point stance) and the defender with a diamond on him. The diamond player looks like he will be covering the slot receiver, so he's not a high-priority rusher on the right side. The center, right guard and right tackle will all slide right to accommodate any twists or blitzes meant to confuse them, and each blocker will take the gap to his immediate right. Whoever shows as a rusher in that player's gap is his responsibility.

Here's the very first step of the protection. Jefferson hasn't even started his drop in earnest, and most of the defenders have already begun to show where they're going. The left tackle is kicking wide to accommodate the d-end's hard outside rush. The running back is stepping up for the b-gap blitzer. The left guard is short-setting his d-tackle so as not to give up an inside rush lane. Dont'a Hightower has taken his first step hard and outside, so the right tackle is bailing outside hard with his first kick step. The potential right-side blitzer looks like he'll be sitting in coverage, so the o-linemen aren't really worried about him.

The trouble here is the defensive tackle on the right side. He hasn't really shown one gap or the other, so the guard isn't quite sure whether he should pass the rusher off to the center and go help his right tackle. The d-lineman is also Alabama's backup noseguard; for the last few plays he's been spinning and trying all sorts of crazy stuff since he just got put in the National Championship Game. The center and guard absolutely hate him because they've been playing hard the entire game only to receive a fresh rusher who is going nuts trying to get to Jefferson. Just a couple plays ago, the center pancaked the youngster and wouldn't let him up; that's when things usually start getting chippy.

The right guard's thirst for blood really hurts the Tigers here. He's so eager to beat up on this young defensive tackle that he doesn't maintain his gap protection as well as he should.

Here we are a mere split-second later. The left guard an tackle are still doing a great job staying on their blocks. The running back is preparing to take on his blitzing backer. However, all is not well on the right side. The right guard has committed fully to the defensive tackle, and Hightower finds the resulting hole in protection quite appetizing.

Everyone on the left side is still doing their job, but the right side is in DEFCON-1. The right tackle over-set his feet because he knew he had help to the inside, and he had to respect Hightower's outside rush speed. Now he's realizing his only help will come from the center, and the help won't make it in time. Jefferson has the bubble open, but it's well-covered and won't get enough yards for the first. He's looking for something deep to come open, but there isn't nearly enough time.

And, it's gone. LSU's best chance of scoring the entire game, that is. 

I can't stress how often this type of mistake happens, especially on a big stage. Offensive linemen love contact, because it's the only thing that makes playing offensive line any fun. With such a long period of time before the game, players start getting antsy; when their chance finally arrives, they can forget their assignments because they just want to hit someone. Say what you want about Nick Saban's dictatorial coaching style, but he showed up with the more disciplined team Monday night.

Chalk Talk: Alabama's Athletic Linemen

College football fans outside the SEC haven't been too excited for this year's national championship, seeing as it will be a rematch of the 9-6 yawn-fest that took place last November. It's been touted by media outlets as a battle of defenses, which is code for "unexciting" for fans that prefer a touch of offensive firepower. However, for fans of stellar offensive line play, the game should be excellent; what takes place in the trenches Monday will be the decisive factor.

Most of the "hype" (if you can call it that) surrounding today's BCS National Championship Game is centered on Alabama and LSU's impenetrable defenses, which are #1 and #2 in the nation statistically. However, both teams boast rushing attacks that average over 200 yards per game. LSU Head Coach Les Miles told the Associated Press yesterday to expect "...big boy football. And I'd expect it to be very, very physical." 

The "big boys" in question are the eight combined returning starters on the offensive line for both teams. Alabama's Barrett Jones was recently named the 2011 Outland Trophy winner. If there's ever a matchup to be dictated by offensive line play, it's this one.

Video used in making these images is courtesy of CBS.

The above play is from Alabama's 2009 SEC Championship victory over Florida. Although the game is older,  this play perfectly illustrates the athleticism of William Vlachos, who is now a senior for the Crimson Tide.

Alabama is asking Vlachos to snap the ball in a shotgun formation, then pull around for the playside linebacker (the Will). The Will backer will be in a perfect spot for Vlachos to execute his block, because the Will is going to flow downhill towards the ball.

Once Vlachos leaves, the two guards will double team the noseguard to the Mike backer (the standing defender who is further down in the frame). Since Ingram will be running the ball to the left outside the numbers (as shown by his arrow), this double team has a great angle and should be able to reach the Mike as he flows towards the ball.

Most of the other blocks here are straightforward; the tackles and tight ends are all performing a reach block on the individual players lined up over them. This involves taking a lateral step while placing one's helmet on the playside numbers of the defender's jersey, then delivering a punch on the inside numbers. The blockers will continue to work laterally to seal their man off and give Ingram a running lane to the left.

So far, the blocking has been executed perfectly. The right guard has already come off his double team block to get the Mike, and all the reach blockers are fighting to seal off the running lane. Vlachos is pulling for the Will backer, who is flowing towards Ingram and doesn't seem to expect a center in his lap.

Vlachos has now made contact with the Will backer and is beginning to drive him outside of Ingram's desired rushing lane. The rest of Bama's blockers are doing an incredible job of staying on Florida's defenders as long as possible. Holding a block for this long is a combination of tenacity and athleticism; against a speedy SEC defense, athleticism is the most important part of keeping these blocks long enough for the running back to make a play.

At this point, Vlachos is driving his man straight into the Alabama bench. This is the type of blocking Les Miles alluded to with his "big boy football" quote. Bama has now cleared an enormous rushing lane that allows for a 15-yard gain.

Look for Bama to combat LSU's incredibly fast defense with schemes such as this. In order to win the rematch, the Crimson Tide need their stellar linemen such as Vlachos and Jones to step up and use their athleticism to provide Trent Richardson with room to make plays. It might not be the touchdown party we saw in this year's Rose or Fiesta Bowls, but the offensive line play on both sides should be some of the best this season.